



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 22, 1983

Senior Interagency Group No. 3

PARTICIPANTS: See List Attached

DATE AND TIME: August 5, 1983, at 10:30 a.m.

PLACE: Room 1105, Department of State

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on International Communications and
Information Policy, August 5

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Under Secretary Schneider chaired a meeting of the SIG for the purpose of reviewing the results of the recently concluded ITU conference on direct broadcasting satellite service in the Western Hemisphere (ITU Region 2).

Ambassador Washburn introduced the members of the delegation and complimented them for their hard work, dedication and resourcefulness. As a result of well-coordinated team work and excellent cooperation between the private and public sector members, the delegation achieved all of its major objectives. Specific achievements included: acquisition of eight orbital positions with 32 channels at each position; adequate spectrum resource for fixed and broadcasting satellite service; sufficient flexibility in the associated plan and regulatory procedures; acceptable spectrum spacing; adoption of a high capacity plan; and extensive use of computer modeling, which was a major factor in convincing the Conference to adopt the high-capacity plan. Another U.S. objective was to maintain the focus of the Conference on technological issues and to avoid extraneous political issues. This was achieved with the exception of the Falklands/Malvinas question. With regard to the non-eclipsed protected arch, we did not quite meet our objective of avoiding discussion of the non-protected section since this was part of a compromise to achieve the U.S. plan; advances in technology should make the non-eclipse protected orbital position more attractive in the future.

Ambassador Washburn asked Mr. Schaefer, Vice Chairman of the Delegation, to comment on strategy and handling of the Falklands/Malvinas situation. Mr. Schaefer noted that our strategy was successful because it was flexible and continuously evolved as events unfolded in Geneva. With regard to the Falklands, in accordance with instructions, the U.S. delegation did not get involved openly in this issue and did not openly support the UK.

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Mr. Schaefer added that the U.S. computer modeling capability was invaluable, not only in assisting the delegation to test different planning scenarios, but also in helping other delegations to see the wisdom of our position. In sum, our computer facilities and expertise gave us a clear advantage in steering the larger countries toward adoption of the high-capacity plan rather than the Cuban-proposed 16-channel plan.

Ambassador Washburn called for reports from the three key committees: Technical, Planning and Procedural.

Technical Committee. Mr. Clark reported that the U.S. delegation was well prepared on substance and technical parameters, but suggested two areas which might require a different approach at future conferences: (1) The United States should look more closely in advance at various technical parameters for planning to identify those which have economic or political ramifications, particularly with our neighbors, but with other countries as well; (2) The U.S. should look at precursors to RARC 83 in the same way we look at precursors to each of the WARCs. A little more one-on-one pre-conference work with other countries, as Brazil and Canada had done, might have helped the United States in achieving its objectives.

Mr. Reinhart noted that one of the most controversial issues in technical parameters was power flex density and receiver sensitivity. When negotiations with the Canadians finally broke down and we found we had convinced no other country that we had the correct value, we began an intensive lobbying effort. Although we gained support from eight countries, and did convert some members of other delegations, those delegations were already committed to previous arrangements they had made with other countries. More lobbying with Latin American countries would have been helpful, although it was understandable that we didn't do so because we were so close so many times to agreement with the Canadians. Had we been able to reach that agreement, the Canadians would have abandoned the Brazilians.

Planning Committee. Mr. Jansky reported that the superior U.S. computer capability made an enormous contribution to our negotiating position. It enabled us to explore problem areas and soft spots in other countries' positions and to point out the advantages of the high-capacity plan to the entire Conference.

Under Secretary Schneider asked the group whether more bilateral missionary work would have been beneficial in achieving

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U.S. objectives. Ambassador Washburn agreed that more pre-conference work would have made a difference.

After considerable discussion on the pros and cons of bilateral consultations, the group noted the importance of sensitizing our embassies to form communications contacts with Communications Ministries and in other appropriate ministries on an ongoing basis so that those contacts would be in place when we need to call on them on short notice. Mr. Blake suggested that the ideal situation would be to encourage diplomatic missions to factor communications into normal work responsibilities just as they discharge responsibilities for agricultural and other exports, civil aviation, banking, etc.

In terms of diplomatic support activities prior to a conference, Under Secretary Schneider questioned whether it might be useful for us to help other countries analyze their own problems with our computer software. It was generally agreed that since computer software is such a powerful analytical tool in terms of analyzing alternative proposals, that we should do everything we can in advance of a conference to help other countries.

Procedures Committee. Mr. Urbany noted that, although the issues were difficult, the U.S. delegation had been quite successful in terms of achieving U.S. objectives. In the procedures area, we did have the objective of flexibility for permitting the introduction of interim systems. Regarding the size of the U.S. delegation, although the United States is often criticized for large numbers, in this case it definitely was to our advantage and worked to our ultimate benefit. He also stressed the importance of firming up a delegation well in advance of any negotiation so that members might have adequate time to prepare and brief themselves on the issues.

Because of the importance of computer modeling to the success of the conference, Ambassador Washburn called on Mr. Franca to comment on it.

Mr. Franca suggested that communications and computer facilities be made a permanent part of the mission in Geneva since so many conferences are held there. He noted that the United States could not rely on the ITU to provide the tools necessary and that the United States must have its own facilities for computer modeling. He commented that if the Conference had been limited to IFRB computer facilities we would not have gotten a plan. The United States made 548 computer runs compared to a maximum of five on the IFRB computer.

Ambassador Washburn stated that there were three ongoing actions that would require attention over the coming months:
(1) Bilaterals with Canada to coordinate the power level of U.S.

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signals at the border. At the turning point in the negotiations, we gave the Canadians assurance that our signals would not be higher than -105 degrees at the border. (2) The inter-regional sharing problem with the USSR. The Soviets have indicated a desire to settle the issue ever since 1980. They sent a cable to the Chairman of the Conference, advising that if their complaints were not resolved soon, they would aggressively seek resolution at the 1985 WARC. Ambassador Washburn noted that, in fact, the situation had worsened as a result of the conference, and that a team should be developed to look at the options. We should consider bilaterals with the Soviets prior to the 85 WARC. (3) Implementation of DBS systems now that RARC results are known. James McKinney, Chief of the FCC Mass Media Bureau, commented on procedures applicants would have to follow to bring their applications into conformity with the RARC.

The major points which appeared to have contributed to the success of the conference, and which would be helpful in preparing for the High Frequency Broadcasting Conference, were summarized as:

1. A conference has dynamics of its own, and the delegation needs a flexible strategy to deal with events as they occur.
2. There is a need for selective missionary work on a bilateral basis, preferably with Ministries of Communication, as soon as possible in advance of the conference.
3. It is important to line up proxy votes in advance and to make sure they are in proper form.
4. There is a need to study the political and economic ramifications on other countries of our own planning procedures.
5. Importance of computer modeling and our own facilities so that we need not rely on IFRB.
6. The delegation should be adequately staffed, and may require larger numbers than might seem appropriate.
7. Need to reorganize communications facility in Geneva, perhaps on a permanent basis.

Peter Sawitz noted that it is misleading to say our computer programs were superior to those of the IFRB. Both were developed by NASA in the United States and were the same. It was procedural restrictions that limited the IFRB to five runs while we made over 500, not the capability of the software itself.

Harley Radin stressed the need for continuity between conferences. While specific topics of each conference are different, much of the background expertise is the same. Some level of continuing collaboration between government and industry is indicated.

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Ambassador Dougan agreed that continuing collaboration between government and industry is indicated and noted that her office could provide that continuity. She welcomed written contributions from all concerned on the pros and cons of the computer aspect suggesting that this be the subject of further study, and indicated her hope that this meeting not be the end of the dialogue. She further stated that follow-up analysis would be done on other aspects of the conference, and the results would be incorporated in future conference preparations.

She added her appreciation to the hard and effective work of all the members of the delegation, the support staff and the Home Team, which produced the successes described in the August 5 meeting.